The IRE Resource Center is a major research library containing more than 23,250 investigative stories — both print and broadcast. These stories are searchable online or by contacting the Resource Center directly (573-882-3364 or firstname.lastname@example.org) where a researcher can help you pinpoint what you need. Browse or search the tipsheet section of our library below. Stories are not available for download but can be easily ordered by contacting the Resource Center:
The IRE Resource Center is a major research library containing more than 23,250 investigative stories — both print and broadcast.
These stories are searchable online or by contacting the Resource Center directly (573-882-3364 or email@example.com) where a researcher can help you pinpoint what you need.
Browse or search the tipsheet section of our library below. Stories are not available for download but can be easily ordered by contacting the Resource Center:
Search results for "George Tenet" ...
The book lays out the defining story of the pre-intelligence failure in Iraq. It focuses on CURVE BALL, the American-issued code name for a young Iraqi chemical engineer who defected to Germany in 1999. During dozens of debriefings with German intelligence officers, he claimed that he had helped design and build sophisticated biological weapons for Saddam Hussein." The story was a hoax, yet the CIA used this evidence as its pretext for war despite numerous warnings about the validity of the claims. Only after its invasion of Iraq did the US formally acknowledge that CURVE BALL was a fraud.
Suskind identifies the doctrine, formulated by Vice President Cheney,as one that "separates analysis from action and embraces suspicion as a threshold for the use of American power." Suskind says Cheney was "the primary architect of U.S. foreign policy" during the period the book profiles, from immediately following 9/11/2001 until 2004. Suskind says in his IRE contest questionnaire that he was able to reassure several sources that he was willing to go to jail for an indefinite period of time to avoid nasming sources; and gave an example of his unwillingness "to reveal sources within ther government to quash the disinformation from ther FBI. Suskind says "The incident is, tereby, instructive in regard to new rules of engagement: the government will release information to cloud an independent report if they are convinced the reporter will be unable, or unwilling to reveal his sources."
Tags: FBI; CIA; NSA; NSC; Iraq; Pentagon; bin Laden; Zawahiri; White House; war on terror; al Qaeda; disinformation; Weapons of Mass Destruction; WMD; Chemical weapons; human sources; humint; sigint; George Tenet; Condoleeza Rice; Zubaydah; DCI
Mission impossible: The inside story of how a band of reformers tried -- and failed -- to change America's spy agencies
Four top CIA officials including retired CIA director George Tenet went on the record to give details of what they thought was wrong with America's spy network. As the investigation reveals, the main problem was an uncoordinated working system that completely ignored basic requests such as Internet hook-ups and connectivity. It also talks about the fact that the collection of information on foreign targets including Iraq was incomplete and disjointed.
Tags: CIA; George Tenet; Joan Dempsey; James Simon; John Gannon; Charlie Allen; Central Intelligence Agency; Iraq; reforms in the CIA; spy; intelligence operations; 9/11 attacks; Iraq war; terrorism; espionage
The New Yorker investigates the failure of the American intelligence, exposed after the September 11th terrorist attacks. The author cites high-ranking intelligence officers who expect that C.I.A. director George Tenet will leave his office. The story reveals that the intelligence community still lacks sound evidence on who initiated and completed the attacks, and how the plan of the terrorists worked over the years. The article also looks at the possibilities for a second terrorist attack and points to the helplessness of the intelligence community to anticipate and prevent it. The investigation depicts the bureaucratic path that American intelligence has been following in the 90s.